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Abstract 
There has been a forty-year divide in economics on the relevance to public funding of the 
equity premium (in particular, today, the consumption CAPM).  The costs and benefits of 
public spending are often correlated with income, but conventional neoclassical analysis, 
applied by many governments, suggests that the cost of this systematic risk in publicly 
funded activities is usually trivial.  On the other hand, it is often asserted that equity market 
premiums, which are very much higher than would be estimated from neoclassical analysis 
(the equity premium ‘puzzle’), should apply also to public funding.  This paper, which aims 
largely to help government administrations, assembles a picture of the evolving research on 
and understanding of the premium.  Public funding does incur social costs arising from the 
associated tax burden.  There is, however, no evidence to support assertions that the equity 
risk premium anomaly is relevant to public funding.  In any case, the cost of systematic risk 
in the benefits of public funding does not fall as an annual percentage rate to financiers, but 
as an absolute cost to public service beneficiaries.   
1. Historical background 
The importance of fluctuations in costs or benefits that vary systematically with income or 
consumption became well recognised in both welfare and financial economics in the 1960s. 
In welfare economics, the effect was estimated from the rate at which the marginal utility of 
consumption declines with increasing income.  The effect can be significant in some overseas 
development projects where, for example, agricultural benefits may be correlated with times 
of poor or abundant food supply.  An important influence was work later summarised by its 
original authors in Little and Mirrlees (1990, 356-357). 
In financial economics, the focus was initially on the systematic variation of equity returns 
with the wider equity market, and developed in the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).   
Traditional CAPM expresses the expected return to a financial asset, E(Ri), as the sum of a 
risk free rate, Rf, and a multiple (the ‘market beta’, βmi) of the risk premium in expected 
returns in the stock market as a whole, {E(Rm) - Rf}.  The late 1970s saw development of a 
generalised version, the consumption CAPM, in which the asset’s market beta is replaced 





Not until the 1980s was it clearly recognised that equity market premiums are higher by 
several percentage points than a conventional neoclassical estimation, as by Little and 
Mirrlees, of the cost of systematic variation with income.  Mehra and Prescott (1985) exposed 
the anomaly under the title of ‘The Equity Premium: A Puzzle’. 
Many experts in financial economics see the rate of return to competitive private financing as 
a market price of capital that applies to both private and public financing (Gollier, 2021, 
Lucas 2014; Brealey et all, 1997).  Many welfare and behavioural economists, in contrast, 
believe that the equity premium anomaly is specific to equity markets and has little if any 
relevance to the cost of public funding, as illustrated by default in US Federal guidance 
(OMB, 1992, 2002) and UK central government guidance (HM Treasury, 1997, 2020), all of 
which drew on national academic input.   
Historically the most common financial economics position (e.g. Brealey et al., 1997; Lucas, 
2014) has been that publicly funded activities should be discounted as if they were privately 
financed.  This has features in common with the ‘social opportunity cost’ (SOC) discounting 
convention, but is a separate literature, different in origin, rationale and authorship.  
In recent years a more sharply focused argument has developed (e.g. Gollier, 2019) for 
adding project-specific ‘consumption CAPM’ risk premiums to social discount rates (added 
to a ‘social time preference’ (STP) rate or, more closely resembling a privately financed cost 
of capital, added to a risk free rate).  This literature has some support from academics 
distinguished in CBA as well as finance (Freeman and Groom, 2016, 14).  However, although 
the consumption beta is more relevant to publicly funded projects than the market beta, both 
betas are multiplied by the anomalously high equity market premium to derive a risk 
premium. 
Section 2 examines what the equity premium literature can demonstrate about the relevance 
of the premium to public funding. 
Section 3 addresses a relevant aspect that falls outside that equity premium literature, which 
is the different ways in which the costs of systematic risk fall with private and public 
financing.   
2. The equity premium literature 
There appears to be no financial economics literature examining, as distinct from asserting, 
the relevance of the equity premium to public funding.i  There is, however, a vast literature 
on potential explanations of the equity premium puzzle.  These studies can be examined for 
plausible explanations that might apply also to public funding.   
The most comprehensive review of these studies is the 80-page work by Mehra (2006), 





then the most conspicuous contributions are continuation of work in behavioural finance.  
There is also work that fits to the historical data a different statistical distribution. 
None of this work refers to or appears to support arguments that the equity premium anomaly 
is relevant to public funding.  
Illustrating the diversity of possible contributory factors to the high equity premium, Mehra 
(2006) includes reviews of five non-risk based factors.  One addresses borrowing constraints, 
where in Mehra’s view ‘Some recent attempts to resolve the puzzle incorporating both 
borrowing constraints and consumer heterogeneity appear promising’.  Others address the 
choice of a riskless asset and (US) government regulations.  Mehra comments that ‘using the 
return on a risk-free asset that is used for saving as a proxy for the intertemporal marginal 
rate of substitution of consumption (instead of a T-bill return) can significantly reduce the 
equity premium.  Adjusting debt returns for government regulations further reduces the 
premium by 1 percent irrespective of the debt asset used as a benchmark’.  These potential, 
partial explanations of the equity premium would not contribute to any such premium with 
public funding. 
Potential risk-based factors include alternative assumptions about preferences.  Mehra and 
Prescott (1985) assumed conventional preferences in which the coefficient of risk aversion (1 
- α) is the reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution σ.  Mehra notes that this 
implies that ‘aversion to variation of consumption across different states at a particular point 
of time is the same as aversion to consumption variation over time and there is no a priori 
reason that this must be so’, and reviews two very different approaches to preferences.   
One approach, Epstein and Zin (1991), presents a class of preferences that they term 
“Generalized Expected Utility” (GEU), which defines utility over time recursively and allows 
(1 – α) and σ to be independent.  This is a significant theoretical advance, widely used in 
monetary and macro analysis (Pariès and Loublier, 2010; Barro, 2015).   
However Mehra notes that “testing this preference structure ... depend on variables that are 
unobservable, and this makes calibration tricky”.  Agents’ wealth evolves in the model as the 
return on all invested wealth.  For this Epstein and Zin use the ‘market portfolio’ as a proxy.  
In Mehra’s view ‘this proxy overstates the correlation between asset returns and e wealth 
portfolio and hence [the authors’] claim that their framework offers a solution to the equity 
premium puzzle’.  Mehra also notes that the GEU model ‘has the potential to resolve the risk-
free rate puzzle’ (i.e. why is it so low?), but finds that to achieve this it would have to be 
assumed that σ is large, whereas there is independent evidence that σ is small.  Mehra 
concludes that ‘hence this generality is not very useful when the model is accurately 
calibrated’.  The GEU model anyway does not explain how the equity premium might apply 





The other approach to preferences applies the behavioural economic concepts of ‘loss 
aversion’ and ‘narrow framing’.  Loss aversion describes the surprisingly consistent ratios of 
about 2 in the weight that people give to perceived financial losses relative to equal gains.   
This concept was developed Kahneman and Tversky (1979), using the term ‘Prospect 
Theory’, which is how it is now usually described.  Narrow framing describes, in this case, 
the assumption that the investor is loss averse over changes in the value of their financial 
wealth, defined as holdings of T-Bills and stocks, disregarding other components of wealth, 
notably human capital and housing.   
The first application of these concepts to the aggregate stock market was Benartzi and Thaler 
(1995).  This developed a single period model and claimed to show that, if investors reviewed 
their holdings annually, loss aversion would fully explain the equity premium.  Mehra 
dismisses this work because it looks at equity investment in isolation, commenting that 
‘without any direct connection to consumption it is impossible to ascertain how their model 
might describe the joint processes on equilibrium returns and consumption growth, for 
example’.  
Mehra has more time however for the later work of Barberis et al (2001), which claims to 
‘help explain the high mean, excess volatility, and predictability of stock returns, as well as 
their low correlation with consumption growth’.ii  Barberis et al estimated a substantial equity 
risk premium, but found that this required a multi-period model, where investors’ preferences 
are influenced by the previous period.  Mehra comments that “Loss aversion/narrow framing 
is an appealing idea and Barberis et al (2001) analyze its equilibrium asset pricing 
implications in a careful and thorough way.  There is, however, a sense in which their study is 
premature.  In particular, we as yet lack choice theoretic underpinnings and the aggregation 
properties are as yet unconfirmed (strict aggregation will not hold).”   
There is here a hint of differences between how behavioural and conventional financial 
economics frame the issues.  Barberis et al is not distinguishing between preferences over 
time and at a point in time, but between risk from equity returns and risk from sources 
(including public service benefits) that do not expose people to large financial losses of which 
they are keenly aware.  Conventional financial economics does not easily accommodate 
preferences that vary across people’s different perceptions of mathematically similar changes 
in income or wealth from different sources.  Such context-specific framing is however 
fundamental to behavioural economics, including behavioural finance. 
Since the Mehra review, work on behavioural finance and equity return has continued.  
Barberis (2015) is a long but accessible and informative set of slides under the heading of 
‘Prospect Theory Applications in Finance’.  Introducing Benartzi and Thaler (1995), Barberis 
notes that the idea of bringing together loss aversion, regular investor review and narrow 





French saying that ‘When I think about my own preferences, this [Prospect Theory] argument 
seems reasonable to me’.  
It also includes from the same interview a comment by Eugene Fama similar to the view of 
the equity premium long held in some, perhaps many government admirations.  Fama’s 
response to ‘Has the equity premium puzzle gone away?’ was ‘There never was one.  It is 
easy to show that this argument is silly.... the high volatility of stock returns ... means that 
getting a positive equity premium (of any size) is highly likely only for holding periods of 35 
years (an investment lifetime) or more.  Given this result, the historical equity premium does 
not seem too high’. 
Experimental evidence on the perverse effect that reviewing portfolios can have on financial 
investors’ returns (Metcalfe, (2017) adds significantiii support for the importance of prospect 
theory in understanding equity returns.  
This behavioural explanation, again, does not apply to the cost of public funding, where there 
are no investors seeking and monitoring personal or institutional financial returns.  
Beneficiaries of publicly funded projects are often subject to income-correlated fluctuations 
in the benefits, but it seems implausible that these often generate material loss aversion.  
In recent work from another perspective Shirvani, et al (2020), after a wide ranging review of 
the literature report that, by fitting the data to a distribution with heavy tails “the relative risk 
aversion coefficient reduced to 8.9626 [sic], a value that is within the range acceptable to 
economists”. iv  The paper contrasts this with ‘explanations for the existence of the puzzle 
relied on arguments put forth by proponents of behavioural finance’.  Time will tell how 
much traction it gains, but even if it were to prevail it would, again, offer no reason why 
equity premiums might be relevant to the benefits of public funding.  
A discussion of the literature on systematic risk and public funding would be incomplete 
without a reference to Arrow and Lind (1970).  That paper, influential in its day, was almost 
entirely about non-systematic risk.  However, it is often presented today (Lucas, 2014; 
Gollier 2021) as if it has led generations of economists to misunderstand systematic risk.  The 
paper was written many years before the consumption CAPM or the equity premium puzzle 
and before even traditional CAPM had spread widely.  It takes a smoother view of 
macroeconomic stability than would be taken today.  However Arrow and Lind’s views on 
the cost of what is now described as systematic risk in publicly funded benefits will have 
been based on application of the neoclassical Little and Mirrlees analysis.  Their doubts about 
whether this cost would ever be significant remain valid.  
Today’s critics agree that neoclassical estimates of the cost of systematic risk are generally 
extremely small.  Gollier and Hammitt (2014, 282, 291) notes that the volatility (standard 





and that, for an investment with a consumption β of 1, with an a elasticity of marginal utility 
of 2, the neoclassical estimate of the risk premium, expressed as a rate of return to investors, 
would be 2x(3%)2 = 0.18%.  The paper adds that ‘On a more normative ground, considering 
such a small systematic risk premium looks very counterintuitive because doing so makes the 
riskiness of projects nearly irrelevant to their evaluation’.  
3. The impact of systematic risk with private and public funding 
Section 2 implicitly accepted the fairly common presumption that public funding by taxation 
can safely be modelled in much the same way as private debt and equity financing. 
Many aspects of financial planning and management are the same or similar with public 
funding and private financing.  However, when public funding is providing non-financial 
benefits the distribution of costs, benefits and risk differs markedly from that with private 
debt and equity financing.  
Private financing is conventionally provided by financiers in exchange for expected financial 
returns.  Its cost is measured as an annual percentage rate of return.  The cost of systematic 
risk in a project’s financial return materialises as a premiums on the percentage rate of return 
required on the financier’s investment. 
Public funding is different.  Public services generally produce no net revenue.  The costs of 
systematic risk fall as absolute reductions in the consumption-value of those benefits that are 
corrected with income.  But, following Little and Mirrlees, these percentage reductions will 
very rarely be more than be trivial.  Moreover they do not accumulated at an exponential rate 
over time.  There is no financial feedback to taxpayers imposing any cost of systematic risk 
to them, as generally happens to equity financiers.   
With public financing the nature of any consumption-equivalent benefits generally has no 
material relationship with the costs of the funding.  The social cost of a marginal dollar of 
general taxation is a dollar of consumption taken from the economy, plus the marginal excess 
tax burden imposed by distortionary and other costs of the taxation.  This cost is broadly the 
same for all public spending.v  
4. Discussion 
Mehra (2006), as background to his review of the literature on the equity premium puzzle, 
commented that “The neoclassical growth model and its stochastic variants are a central 
construct in contemporary finance, public finance, and business cycle theory. ... The model 
has had some remarkable successes when confronted with empirical data.  Unfortunately, 
when confronted with financial market data on stock returns, tests of these models have led, 
without exception, to their rejection.” (Emphasis added).  The equity market premium is thus 





financial markets.  It is thus unsurprising that many experts in that field, when faced with 
social discounting in government, should presume that the market cost of capital applies, like 
most other competitive market prices, to the public sector, but it is disappointing that this 
presumption appears always to be presented as an unqualified assertion.   
From a welfare and behavioural economics perspective it is at least plausible that the freedom 
of equity markets, while essential for their vital function in a market economy, leads to 
extreme fluctuations and behavioural impacts on investors that have a significant (but 
unavoidable and acceptable) cost.  The concept of competitive markets imposing costs in 
such a way may not, however, fit easily with the ‘efficient markets’ spirit of financial 
economics as it developed from the 1960s.   
Both sides of this debate have acquired what they may see as heavy weapons.   
On one side, the consumption CAPM, developed in the late 1970s, provides a ‘consumption 
beta’ that can sensibly be applied to public service benefits as well as returns to commercial 
returns to equity.  However, while multiplying a consumption beta by the equity market 
premium makes sense for equity funded activities, it makes no clear sense for activities that 
are publicly funded. 
On the other side, behavioural finance has now looked seriously at the impact of fluctuations 
in equity returns on financial investors, in theory and to a limited extent empirically.  This 
work provides good evidence that the anomalous high returns to equity are at least largely 
attributable to the nature of equity markets for reasons that do not apply to public funding.   
Less widely recognised, but also quantitatively important, is the very different way in which 
the cost of systematic risk falls in markets financed by debt and equity as opposed to 
activities funded by public spending.  In the former case the cost falls as a higher required 
annual rate of return to private financiers.  In the latter, public funding case, the cost falls as 
an absoluter reduction in the value of the benefits to the public service beneficiaries. 
5. Conclusion 
Many financial experts believe that the costs of financing revealed by competitive financial 
markets is a social cost that applies equally to public funding of similar activities.  However, 
the differences between financing by investors seeking a financial return and funding by 
taxation are substantial.   
Private financing has crucial, beneficial incentive impacts that are lacking with public 
funding.  However, there is good evidence that the freedom of equity markets that contributes 
greatly to these benefits also brings significant costs.  There is also good evidence that these 





benefits of public funding does not fall as an annual rate of return, but as a reduction in the 
value of the benefit’s to beneficiaries.   
The benefits of publicly funded projects, in developed as well as less developed economies, 
are sometimes strongly covariant with income, but the cost of virtually any plausible 
covariance appears to be trivial. 
However, given the subtlety of the issues, and the tending for them to be framed very 
differently by experts with different analytical backgrounds, professional consensus may be a 
long way off. 
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Appendix: Traditional and consumption CAPM 
The traditional CAPM is expressed as  
E(Ri) = Rf + βmi{E(Rm) - Rf} 
where 
E(Ri) is the expected rate of return on an asset i 
Rf is the risk-free interest rate 
E(Rm) is the expected average market rate of return 
βmi = market beta for asset i = cov(Ri,Rm)/varRm. 
The term in curly brackets is the “market premium”.   
If the return to the asset varies proportionately to the market average return βMi = 1 and the 
estimated asset premium is equal to the market premium. 
The Consumption CAPM redefines beta as 
βci = consumption beta for asset i = cov(Ri,Rc)/cov(Rm,Rc) 
where  
Rc is the consumption growth rate.   
If the return to the asset varies proportionately to consumption βCi = 1.  As with the 
traditional CAPM, the estimated asset premium is again equal to the equity market premium. 
Thus, while benefits of public spending or regulation are likely to have consumption betas 
higher than market betas, the question of whether the equity market premium is materially 
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